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Memory frequently provides key evidence in the courtroom.  Whether 
children or adults are providing evidence, all memory reports contain details of past 
experiences, ones that have usually happened months or years in the past or, in an 
increasing number of cases (at least in the UK), involving memories that may have 
been formed some 20, 30, or 40 years earlier.  Worse, some of these memories may 
have been formed during periods of life when encoding, storage, and retrieval 
processes were not operating in an optimal fashion (e.g., during early childhood, 
under conditions of extreme stress, or under the influence of alcohol or drugs that 
compromise memory functioning).  As testimony based on such reconstructive 
memories can convict, the important forensic issue concerns how well versed triers-
of-fact are on the vicissitudes of memory.  If triers-of-fact are not aware of how 
memory operates under the various different conditions in which witnesses have 
formed their memories (not to mention what has transpired between the encoding of 
these experiences and the time they are recalled on the witness stand), then how can 
they possibly be expected to adequately evaluate memory-based evidence?  This is 
particularly worrisome when memory evidence is uncorroborated and, therefore, 
serves as the only evidence.   
This latter question is not as simple as some of us might have hoped.  There 
are some circumstances in which courts decide that memory expertise is not 
necessary at all.  This is because, as some judges have opined, jurors have experience 
with their own memories and should be able to capitalize on this knowledge when 
evaluating memory evidence.  Indeed, in some cases, experts have been seen as 
usurping the function ascribed triers-of-fact.  That is, jurors, not experts, are to decide 
where the truth lies. 
Of course, the role of the expert is not to say where the truth of the case lies, 
but rather, to provide the truth about what our science says about memory.  Such 
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expert evidence serves the probative function of allowing the triers-of-fact to 
properly evaluate memory evidence, without which, judgments are made on the basis 
of personal introspection of how memory works.  Such judgments are notoriously 
unreliable and inaccurate.  Any numbers of surveys have found that most people 
have very little insight into how memory operates and a number of authors have tried 
to dissuade laypeople about the many myths of memory (e.g., Patihis, Tingen, & 
Loftus, 2013).  It is not just laypeople who are naïve when it comes to memory, but 
research has established that judges, jurors, and law enforcement personnel are all 
too often relying on “common sense” notions of memory rather than scientific facts 
(e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; Magnussen et al., 2006).   
It is difficult to know the number of miscarriages of justice that exist due to 
triers-of-fact not having sufficient knowledge about memory, relying instead on 
common sense.  Figures from the Innocence Project in New York City 
(www.innocenceproject.org) show that 306 people have been exonerated (as of May 
14, 2013), people who had been wrongly convicted in whole or in part based on 
eyewitness testimony, people who spent an average of 13.6 years in prison prior to 
being released.  It is clear that the current disconnect between what the science of 
memory has to offer and its acceptance in the judicial process can have serious 
consequences.  Not only does expert testimony about memory need to be a part of the 
judicial process in trials where memory provides the key (or only) evidence, but it 
should also form part of the instruction provided to triers-of-fact before they decide 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant (for recent progress along these lines, see 
Schacter & Loftus, 2013). 
With this as backdrop, we wanted to provide a compendium of articles where 
memory scholars who have provided expert memory evidence could demonstrate 
how the science of memory can best serve the course of justice.  To this end, we offer 
this Special Issue of Memory, one that contains articles by leading memory 
researchers who also provide their memory expertise through evaluating evidence or 
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providing testimony in the courtroom.  We specifically asked that these articles detail 
the authors’ experiences in legal cases and by writing about cases the authors have 
acted in (usually as an expert witness).  We asked contributors to describe a case or 
several cases in which they provided expert advice, advice that clearly demonstrates 
the contribution of a memory expert to a court or other body in judging evidence in 
the form of memories.  We asked that they describe their contribution to the legal 
process whether that contribution was accepted or rejected, influenced the outcome 
positively or negatively, or impacted on some aspects of the proceedings but not 
others.  Authors were encouraged to give firsthand accounts of their own experiences 
and to discuss any lessons learned, lessons that may help others wanting to become a 
memory expert witness.   
Our overall aim was to compile a volume that provides a record of 
experience and practice as well as accounts of lessons learned and how being a 
memory expert has allowed a contribution that would not have been otherwise 
possible.  Although this Special Issue may not eliminate the gap between the science 
of memory and it application in forensic contexts, we hope it serves to lessen the 
divide.  If nothing else, the contributions to this issue contain some extremely useful 
suggestions as to how courts and other official bodies might be guided by and benefit 
from our current understanding of memory.  Together, these articles provide direct 
links between what we have learned from the scientific study of memory and the 
applications of this knowledge to specific legal cases. 
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